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Recent Developments in Tort Law
and the Federal Courts*
By JOHN W. WADE**
INTRODUCTION
During the past two or three decades, the law of torts has ex-
perienced more extensive change than perhaps any other field of
the common law. To a surprising extent tort law is being substan-
tially remade. Under the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' this
of course spills over into the federal courts in diversity cases. This
ferment has become contagious and has affected several aspects
of the federal law of torts as well. Any thorough study of the ex-
tent to which the work of the federal courts is changing should
give attention to these matters.
In this Article I propose to analyze briefly the nature of the
developments in tort law in the state courts and to offer an inter-
pretation of their significance, and then to consider in somewhat
greater detail certain areas of federal tort law that have recently
been experiencing substantial modification. These areas are (1)
governmental tort immunities, (2) tort liability "implied" from
federal legislation and (3) the effect of the First Amendment on
tort actions involving written or oral speech.
I. CHANGES IN TORT LAW IN STATE COURTS
The first significant mutation involved the question of whether
a child has a cause of action for an injury incurred before its birth.
Prior to 1946, courts unanimously held that the child had no cause
of action. Beginning with a decision of the federal district court
for the District of Columbia in that year,2 the law has complete-
*Ed. Note: This Article is based on a transcription of a talk given at the annual Judicial
Conference on the Sixth Federal Circuit held in the late summer of 1982, with the theme
"The Work of the Federal Courts: Is It Changing or Not?"
While the talk has been edited for publication and footnotes have been added, it
has been permitted to retain an informal approach pursuant to Dean Wades request. No
attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised.
**Dean Emeritus and Distingushed Professor of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt University
School of Law; Reporter, Restatement (Second) of Torts, Volumes 3 and 4.
1304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
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ly changed and courts now unanimously hold that the action will
lie. 3 A second area of tort law experiencing extensive and broad
revision is tort immunity of various types: governmental,
4
charitable institutions,5 and intra-familial. 6 The wave of change
proceeded to the field of products liability, where the completely
new approach of strict tort liability for products was created and
modifications in product liability for negligence and implied war-
ranty were made.
7
Another area that has experienced substantial modification is
the effect of plaintiff's fault in a tort action. Formerly this was
limited to the doctrines of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk, with their ramifications. Now the vast majority of
the states have comparative negligence in one form or another.8
Change has also occurred in the area of landowner's tort liabili-
ty: the hierarchy of types of persons coming onto the premises is
being merged into a single group for an ordinary negligence ac-
tion. The nature of the plaintiff's status is now being treated merely
as one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration. 9
3 For the current rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 reporter's note (1982) for a list of cases support-
ing the proposition.
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895A-895C (1979). For a list of cases
following this proposition, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895A-895C reporter's
note (1982).
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 895E reporter's note (1982) for a list of cases supporting this proposition.
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895F-895G (1979). For citation to cases
following this proposition, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895F-895G reporter's
note (1982).
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A-402B (1979); Wade, Tort Liability
for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. REv. 1
(1983); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973).
8 See Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and
Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299 (1980). See also UNiF. COMPARATiVE
FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1983). For a discussion of comparative negligence in
Kentucky, see Rogers & Shaw, A Comparative Negligence Checklist To Avoid Future Un-
necessary Litigation, 72 KY. L.J. 25 (1983-84).
9 The seminal case is Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) ("Al-
though the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may, in the light of the
facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing on the question of liability, the status
is not determinative").
Cf. Kermaree v Compagme Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959)
(holding that a shipowner owes a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances toward
DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT LAW
Many changes have also occurred in the field of professional
negligence. 0 There are numerous additional changes, but it
would divert from the central theme of this Article to attempt to
describe them in full detail."
What does all of this mean? My suggestion is that the more
thoughtful judges have come to the conclusion that the common
law of torts needs to be kept up to date, that it needs to be in con-
formity with our current mores and ethical ideals, and that the
appellate judges should assume the responsibility for performing
this task. This has not been stated in express words in the opinions,
but an examination of the cases reveals that this is now coming
to be the judicial attitude toward the common law, at least in the
field of torts. The common law has been continually developing
throughout its history and the process is now being much more
frankly and openly carried out.
12
This performance may sound as if it is a completely new oc-
currence, but a similar development has happened several times
in the history of the common law. Around the beginning of the
mneteenth century the whole concept of negligence was brought
into the law by the courts. In that same general period, commer-
cial law became a part of the common law by absorbing the
customs of merchants. Lord Mansfield was primarily responsible
for this. He also brought in the law of quasi-contract, which has
since turned into our modern restitution.
Several years later, there was another period in which substan-
tial change occurred in the law But that period coincided with
the Industrial Revolution and the changes were for different
reasons. Courts began to limit tort rights during this time. In this
all visitors on board his ship for purposes not inimical to the shipowner's legitimate in-
terests, but declining to incorporate into admiralty law the common law distinctions be-
tween licensees and invitees).
10 See, e.g., Woodruff v.Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th cir. 1980) (attorney's standard
of care in conducting litigation); Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444 (Me. 1980) (national
standard of care for doctors); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979) (informed coii-
sent). For a general treatment of this issue see D. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (1969); R. MALLEN & LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1981).
11 For a comprehensive list of state court cases overruling prior tort law, see R.
KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 169 app. (1969).
12 For further discussion of this concept, see Wade, The Most Important Tort
Change in the Third Quarter of the Twentieth Century, 20 ATLA L. REP. 413 (1977).
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period, the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
the fellow-servant rule and matters of that sort became a part of
the law of negligence.
Thus, it is not unusual to have periods of extensive change in
the development of the common law. We are just more candid
about it now. At one time, of course, the attitude was that the
judges do not make the law, but instead they find it. They defin-
ed it, and occasionally the definers were somewhat more prophetic
and had a clear channel to the "brooding ommpresence in the
sky"'13 to determine the true state of the law The attitude was
that the common law developed within itself. In the classic case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,14 Judge Cardozo found that
so many exceptions to the rule requiring privity of contract in a
negligence action for harm caused by a dangerous product had
developed that these exceptions had simply eroded the rule and
had become the true rule, so that it was the responsibility of the
court to declare it that way 15
Today, with a more candid attitude, the indication is that
when a particular rule of law is no longer in accord with our cur-
rent concepts and ideals, it is the responsibility of the courts to
bring the law into accord. One may well wonder how far this is
going to go. It has been most prevalent in tort law, but is giving
indications of spreading to other areas as well.
16
In the law of torts, except for a few instances, such as defama-
tion, the scope of liability has been broadened. Rules restricting
the right of recovery have been eliminated or modified. These rules
were usually for the purpose of controlling the jury At the earlier
time, the courts were not ready to trust the jury, and they laid
down rules of law to take the issue out of its hands. Some examples
of where this occurred include immunities, landowner's liability,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the requirement
of privity. These were categoric rules, somewhat crude in applica-
tion and perhaps justifying the appellation, "primitive."
13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
15 Id. at 1054.
16 See Wade, supra note 12, at 414, for the suggestion that the approach may spread
to other areas of law.
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In their first enthusiasm for changing these primitive restric-
tions, the courts often abolished them outright. Then they began
to discover that they had gone too far, that they still needed to
have some basis for reasonable control of the jury As a result,
they have now begun to set up more sophisticated rules for main-
tainig control to reach a more balanced adjustment.'
7
The federal courts have also been doing something of this
nature in the areas in which they apply common law. Thus, in
admiralty law, the Supreme Court changed the rule about the ef-
fect to be given contributory negligence, substituting pure com-
parative negligence for the practice of dividing the recovery in
half.' 8 The Third Circuit adopted a rule of comparative
causation 19 for the Virgin Islands that evolved out of the concepts
of comparative negligence and strict liability 0 In a 1974 deci-
sion involving air traffic control,21 the Seventh Circuit adopted
a federal common law rule of comparative contribution.2
17 For example, certain adjustments became necessary when tort immunities were
abrogated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895B & comments c-e, (state im-
munity), 895F comment h (spousal immunity), 895G comment k (parental immunity).
The first comparative negligence systems often allowed the jury to render
a lump-sum verdict without any indication of how it was reached. Later
systems reqmre the jury to declare the total amount of plaintiffs damages
and the percentages of fault of the parties. This makes it possible for the
trial judge to determine if the jury knew what it was doing.
18 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975). The Court
stated:
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault
to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for
such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the com-
parative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be
allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is
not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault.
Id.
19 See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power Sys., Inc., 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1979).
20 Id. at 153-63. The court concluded: "Unlike comparative negligence, comparative
fault asks the trier of fact to allocate the loss solely on the causal connection between the
faulty product, i.e., the defect and the injury, and the faulty conduct of the plaintiff and
the injury." Id. at 163.
21 Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975).
22 See id. at 405.
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II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Governmental Immunities Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
I come now to the subject of the federal law of governmental
immunities. This area is controlled by the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA),2 which was enacted three and a half decades ago.
There have been some problems with the FTCA. First, the
Act immunizes the federal government from tort liability when
carrying out "discretionary functions," but does not define the
term.2 Second, the FTCA does not say whether the Act permits
recovery on the basis of strict liability.2 Whether the FTCA ap-
plies to governmental conduct that would not be engaged in by
a private individual is also not stated.26
Some other problems have also been encountered in trying to
interpret the FTCA. The FTCA contains an exception in its
coverage for liability in cases of intentional torts, such as assault,
battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and others.Y
The courts have held this to mean that if the action could have
been brought in battery, even though it would normally be brought
in negligence, the exception applies.s For example, suppose a
surgeon negligently operates on the wrong leg of a patient. Since
this act is without consent, battery will lie. It makes no difference
23 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended m
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Under the FTCA, an action
may not be brought against the government if the alleged injury occurred as a result of
the exercise of a "discretionary function" on the part of a federal agency or employer.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). Dalehite interpreted "discretionary function" to include the
initiation of programs and activities, as well as determinations made by executives or ad-
ministrators in establishing plans, specifications and schedules of operation. 346 U.S. at
35-36.
See also James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function" Ex-
ception: The Sluggtsh Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 184 (1957);
Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Func-
tion Exception, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956).
25 See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972) (holding that the FTCA does not
authorize recovery on the basis of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity).
2 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (deciding that
the federal government could be held liable under the FTCA for negligence in an activity
which would not be done by a private individual).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
28 Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1955).
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that in performing the operation on the wrong leg the doctor was
negligent. No action may be brought under the FTCA.2
The same approach has also been used in connection with
misrepresentation. If information is conveyed by words, the
FTCA30 has precluded recovery, though the claim might have
arisen out of negligence in rendering a service. 3' If an action for
misrepresentation could possibly lie, the court formerly held that
the case must be treated on this basis, therefore excluding a cause
of action under the FTCA.32 This way of refusing to recognize
the gravamen of the cause of action is quite unreasonable. The
Supreme Court, however, has recently indicated in Block v.
Neal3 that, while the government may be immune under the
"misrepresentation" exception, it is not automatically immune from
a distinct claim arising out of the same government conduct.34
There has now been a considerable amount of experience with
the functioning of the FTCA. The state courts and legislatures have
also had much experience with the subject of governmental im-
munities. All of this suggests that the time has arrived for a careful
attempt to revise the FTCA.
B. The Extent of Immunity Given to Governmental Officials
Perhaps the major problem for the federal courts in connec-
tion with immunities is the issue of the extent of the immunity
to be given to governmental officials. Traditionally, the leading
case has been Gregoire v. Biddle,3 in which Judge Learned
Hand held that a federal prosecutor had full immunity even though
the complaint alleged that he was acting maliciously, knowing
that there was no justifiable basis for the prosecution. 36 Subse-
2 See td. at 706. See also Hernandez v. United States, 465 F Supp. 1071, 1074 (D.
Kan. 1979) (surgeon operated after being told that the patient did not want the opera-
tion, summary judgment granted in favor of the government because of the battery nature
of the claim).
30 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
31 See United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1961) (holding that the true
basis of the cause of action was misrepresentation rather than negligent inspection).
32 
Id. at 711.
'3 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983).
Id. at 1094.
3 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. dented, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
36 Id. at 581.
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quently, in Barr v. Matteo,37 an action for defamation, the
Supreme Court held that even the lower levels of federal officials
had immunity. 38 It was not entirely clear in that case, however,
whether its rule extended beyond defamation to other kinds of
torts, and a good deal of uncertainty resulted. Much of this has
now been largely clarified by the case of Butz v. Economou.39
This case recognized full immunity for legislative and judicial of-
ficials, including a prosecutor. Butz also indicated that even ad-
ministrative officials have full immunity if they are engaged in
an adjudicatory function or prosecutorial work.40 For ad-
ministrative officers engaged in other functions, the Court declared
that the immunity (or privilege) is only qualified, depending on
whether they act in good faith or not.
41
The courts, at one time or another, have covered the full gamut
regarding the immunity of government officials. Some cases find
an official liable if a decision is wrong regardless of whether it
had a reasonable basis or not. At the other extreme are the holdings
that the official has complete immunity, as in the case of a judge
or prosecutor. In between are two intermediate positions. One is
that there is no liability if the official acted on the basis of a
reasonable decision. The other is that the official is not liable if
he acted in good faith-as indicated in Butz. 42 Sometimes these
last two views are combined into a single test.43
It is interesting to draw an analogy between the tort liability
of governmental officials and that of professionals. A negligence
standard is used to determine professional malpractice. Profes-
sionals are held to a duty of reasonable care and to the state of
knowledge, training and skill common to the profession. But there
is no liability for a "mere error of judgment." 44 In addition, the
37 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
38 Id. at 572-75.
39 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
40 Id. at 514-15.
41 Id. at 507.
42 Id.
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 895D comment e (1979). For a collection
of cases and law review articles discussing the immunity of public officers, see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D reporter's note (1982).
44 There are many cases on this. On the liability of attorneys, see, e.g., Lucas v.
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) cert. dented, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Hodges v. Carter,
80 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1954).
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standard for determining a reporter's liability for defamation is
recklessness. If the statement is regarding a public figure, there
must be knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard concerning the
truth or falsity of the statement.
45
How are these situations similar to that of the governmental
official? They are similar in the sense that they, too, are concern-
ed with jury controls. If the defendant is a trained professional,
the court wants to be careful not to permit the jury to second-
guess his decision in the way a Monday-morning quarterback does.
Knowing now that a pass tried on Saturday or Sunday didn't work
and the ball changed hands without the team making a
touchdown, he has no trouble in deciding that the quarterback
made the wrong choice of plays. The deference toward the pro-
fessional that is involved in these cases is similar to that held to
apply for a governmental official, the theory being that, like a
doctor, or an attorney or a journalist, a governmental official is
an experienced expert entitled to protection against jury second-
guessing on the basis of knowledge of the outcome.
Another way to look at the tort actions against governmental
officials is to recognize that the action amounts to a form of review
of official action. Other ways usually exist to review that action,
either admimstratively or through the court system. The courts
may consider whether allowing an action brought to obtain
monetary damages is the best way to conduct the review. This
may, on occasion, affect the decision of whether a tort action
should lie. Tort law has a number of purposes. The primary one
is to provide compensation for an injury Another is to constitute
a deterrent against engaging in the harmful conduct. Still another
is to declare rights and to enforce them, make them effective. With
respect to governmental officials, tort law may serve as an om-
budsman, providing injured persons an avenue of redress.46
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND TORT LAW
The heading for my third topic may give an erroneous im-
pression. My discussion is not of statutes expressly providing for
45 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46 See Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155 (1973) (discussing
1983-84]
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tort liability, but instead of statutes that contain no such provi-
sion. If the legislation is inconsistent with a common law rule,
the legislation will, of course, control. If there is no clear incon-
sistency and no express indication of whether the legislative pro-
vision applies to this situation, the custom is to look for the
legislative intent. If that intent is clearly ascertainable there is still
no difficulty; the intent will control. But if the intent 12 not in-
dicated then real difficulty arises.
The typical situation may arise as follows: A congressional act
proscribes certain conduct or directs that certain action be taken.
This is done for the protection of an identifiable group of people.
The act may provide for a criminal penalty but it does not pro-
vide for any civil relief through the use of a court action. The nor-
mal civil remedy would be a tort action for damages to compen-
sate for the harm incurred. Should the court "imply" a tort ac-
tion to meet this need?
This is basically a question of statutory construction, and one
might assume that assistance could be obtained from the rules of
statutory interpretation. Consider two well known maxims: Ubt
ius, ibi remedium; 47 and Expressio unius exclusio alterius est.48 As
is usual in this field, the maxims go in opposite directions, and
the court is left to find other means of reaching a decision.
The earlier Supreme Court cases49 readily recogmzed a tort
action when none was expressly provided, saying that "it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."O In
1975, this approach was reviewed in the case of Cort v. Ash,3'
where the Court laid down a set of four factors to be considered
in determining whether to "imply" the tort action: (1) the plain-
the potential function of tort law as a protector of "ordinary people from the abuse of
governmental power").
17 "Where there is a right, there is a remedy." BLAcK's LAW DIc'rIONARY 1363 (rev.
5th ed. 1979).
48 "The expression of one tlung is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAw DirxoNARY
521 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general
rule, other exceptions are excluded. Id.
49 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & P Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33 (1941).
50 377 U.S. at 433.
5' 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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tiff must be "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted"52 (2) there must be some "indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit. . to create a remedy,"ss (3) the
remedy must be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme," 4 and (4) it must not be inappropriate for
federal law because it is "an area basically the concern of the
States."ss This, of course, had the effect of somewhat reducing
the number of cases in which a tort action was permitted.
Later cases have tended to make the decision depend solely
upon a finding of the intent of Congress, perhaps with a presump-
tion one way or the other. We therefore find the courts talking
about congressional intent when none was stated, delving into the
legislative history and twisting it about to find a nonexistent in-
tent. From time to time judges have shown an awareness of this.
Justice Harlan, for example, speaking of the Borak case says:
There we "implied" a private cause of action for
damages. The exercise of judicial power involved in Borak
simply cannot be justified in terms of statutory construction
nor did the Borak court purport to do so. . The notion of im-
plying a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can
only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises
a choice among traditionally available judicial remedies accord-
ing to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied
in an act of positive law 56
Traditionally available remedies include a declaratory judg-
ment, an injunction, a rescission and an award of monetary
damages. The statute having established the policy and created
the right, the court simply supplies the remedy It makes no dif-
ference whether the action is called one in tort or not, so long as
the remedy is one that is in the court's repertoire. This rationale
effectively refutes the argument that the court is violating the prin-
ciple of separation of powers in exceeding the constitutional judicial
function. This is very similar to what the court does when it has




56 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 403 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
1983-84]
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before it a section 1983 action. The right is created by the statute,
but the court must fill in the details and determine the appropriate
remedy.7
Finding an "intent" when there is no intent is a hallucination,
often covering up the real reasons that are influencing the justices.
Sometimes the actual reasons are indicated when a court declines
to imply a tort action. In- a number, of opimons, the concern is
about the congressional act. These acts are often extremely com-
plex and very detailed, particularly in the regulatory provisions.
So many details are included in the act that the courts will be
thoroughly swamped if they try to enforce them all with damage
actions. This is the flood-of-cases rationale which is quite
persuasive.
The clarity with which the right is expressed and whether en-
forcement of it by a tort action is needed to accomplish the essen-
tial purpose of the statute may be the most significant considera-
tions. The members of the Supreme Court remain very sharply
divided on whether to "imply" a cause of action in particular situa-
tions, and the division is usually close to being even. Currently,
most of the cases are holding that a tort action will not lie.
The Supreme Court has been more willing to "imply" a cause
of action for violations of constitutional provisions. 58 Since the
decision in Bivens,s9 several cases have implied a cause of action
for a constitutional violation.o Three reasons for this may be
suggested. First, the constitutional right may be much more im-
portant than a statutory right. Second, the constitutional right is
probably more clearly identifiable. Third, while Congress can easi-
ly provide for a damage action if it thinks that the Court wrongly
failed to imply one, it is difficult to amend the Constitution for
this purpose.
57 Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (although § 1983 does not include a pro-
vision for damages, the Court applied general tort principles, including the requirement
of actual harm and the use of nominal damages). See also Robinson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584 (1978) (application of state survivorship statutes to actions under § 1983).
•s8 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (8th Amendment); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979) (5th Amendment).
59 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. at 388.
60 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 144; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 228.
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Some years ago, in a symposium on statutory construction,
Charles P. Curtis wrote an article entitled, "A Better Theory of
Legal Interpretation."61 He suggested that the question to ask
when it is not possible to find an actual legislative intent is not
what the legislature would have done if it had thought about the
matter, but what it would do if it had that issue before it now.62
While this may sound startling, it is a very interesting idea that
may be quite useful. Consider some analogies. Suppose a federal
district judge has a case before him raising a question that the
Supreme Court ruled on a number of years ago. Further suppose
that there are current indications that the Supreme Court might
decide the issue otherwise today. Does the judge not try to divine
what the Court would decide now? Or suppose it is a diversity
case in which he must follow the state rules. Does he simply follow
the last holding in the state even though it is now out-dated, or
does he try to anticipate what the state court would now do?6
There are numerous instances in which judges have taken the lat-
ter course. Unfortunately, there is no system for certifying a ques-
tion of law to the Congress.
In the state courts the doctrine of negligence per se takes care
of many of these cases. In state law the action of negligence already
exists at common law. The court, however, may substitute a
specific rule of conduct for the usual general standard of what
a reasonably prudent person would do under the same or similar
circumstances. It is a recognized part of the judicial function to
do this when the court is convinced that the rule is proper as a
substitute for the general standard. When there is a criminal statute
or a regulatory provision, the court may take that provision and
lay it down as a substitute for the general standard of negligence.
The practice is very useful in the state courts and means that the
courts do not have to "imply" a cause of action; they may simply
adopt the provision as the specific rule of conduct to be applied
in the particular case.6
61 Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950).
62 Id. at 414-15.
63 Id. at 416-17.
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 285, 286 (1965); Clinkscales v. Carver,
136 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1943).
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Unfortunately, this method cannot be used in the federal courts
because there is no general federal common law of negligence in-
to which it can fit. But the fact that the federal courts are unable
to use the doctrine of negligence per se does not prevent the state
court from doing exactly that. If the state court can take the pro-
vision in a state statute or municipal ordinance and make a viola-
tion of it negligence per se, it can certainly do the same thing with
a violation of a federal statute, since all of the people in the state
are supposed to obey the federal law as well as the state law.6
Now, going one step further, assume a diversity action in federal
court. Under the Erie doctrine the federal court must apply state
law, and we thus may have the federal court using a federal statute
to produce a judgment for a damages award even though the
Supreme Court has said that Congress did not intend for a damages
action to arise.66
The state courts, of course, are not confined to the doctrine
of negligence per se. Most of the law of torts is common law In
their capacity as originators and up-daters of tort common law,
the courts may take a significant state policy indicated by a statute
65 See, e.g., Steagall v. Dot Mfg. Corp., 446 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1969) (Federal
Hazardous Substances Act).
66 See Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963) (Federal Hazardous
Substances Labeling Act); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960)
(Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act).
See also Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1980). Defendant
Jensen was low bidder on a construction contract for the Corps of Engineers subject to
the Federal Small Business Act and plaintiff was second low bidder. Defendant had cer-
tified itself as a small business. However, it did not qualify, since the business done by
its affiliates was counted as required by the Act. Making false statements to certify con-
stituted a crime under the Act; but it did not provide for any civil relief and other courts
had held that a cause of action could not be "implied" under the Act. Id. at 1297-99.
In a diversity suit to recover for the unjust enrichment of the defendant at plaintiffs ex-
pense, the court held that there could be no claim for federal relief under the statute.
It also held, however, that recovery was available under the Iowa common law. Id. at
1302. In determining that the profit under the contract was unjust enrichment, the Iowa
court might look to the Federal Act to decide that the enrichment was unjust or improperly
acquired. The Iowa court was not implying a cause of action; it would be applying its
common law of restitution and the Congress did not impliedly prohibit the state from
looking to the provisions of the Small Business Act "as a standard in determining whether
Jensen has committed fraud or been unjustly enriched." Id. at 1299. This court decided
that the Iowa court would find unjust enrichment, but would not find fraud because of
lack of scienter. Under Erie in a diversity case, the court regarded itself as required to
follow the Iowa law Id. at 1304.
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and use it to create a new tort cause of action or to modify an
existing tort action. All of this is discussed in some detail in sec-
tion 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,67 where ex-
amples and citations are given and the special features of the
federal situation are also treated.68
A very apt treatment in a state court may be found in Burnette
v. Wahl,69 where the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether
the Oregon statute making it a felony to abandon one's own child
should be treated as a basis for giving rise to a tort action for
damages based on psychological injury to a child abandoned by
its mother. Three separate approaches are presented in as many
opinions, and each is quite well developed.70
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TORT LAW
Eighteen years ago the Supreme Court decided the case of New
York Times v. Sullivan.71 This was a true case of a court "mak-
ing law " The state of constitutional law was profoundly differ-
ent after the decision. But I am not deprecating the case or accus-
ing the Court of exceeding its judicial function. The Court saw
a vital need and met it. The action for libel was being utilized
as a legal blackjack to beat the newspapers into ceasing their
treatments of certain significant social issues. Whether that con-
duct violated the free speech and free press clauses had not
previously been before the Court, and the issue was properly ad-
dressed and decided.
The other leading case on defamation and the first amend-
ment is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.72 Together, Gertz and New
York Times have settled some of the essential constitutional re-
quirements for a defamation action, whether the plaintiff is a
public figure or a private person. These requirements include (1)
fault on the part of the defendant regarding truth or falsity and
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A comments a-f, h-j (1979).
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A comment g (1979).
9 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978).
70 Id. at 1105, 1112 (Lent, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 1115 (Linde,
J., dissenting).
71376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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(2) "actual damages." 3 But there are many new problems raised
by these cases that the Court has not yet considered, much less
settled. The Court is feeling its way as it moves slowly It has made
some false starts that have forced it to change its position.
A. The First Amendment and the Tort of Defamation
The Supreme Court has yet to take a stand on several first
amendment issues. One such issue is whether the first amendment
applies to determine if a communication is defamatory. This pro-
blem actually came before the Court in 1941, long before the deci-
sion in New York Times.74 A newspaper charged a congressman
with opposing the appointment of an attorney as federal judge
solely because he was Jewish. The federal district court dismissed
the complaint in a libel suit brought by the congressman. The Se-
cond Circuit reversed by a vote of two to one, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. It allowed briefs amici curiae from
several groups, but finally dropped the case with a single-sentence
per curiam memorandum reading simply, "The judgment is af-
firmed by an equally divided court." 75 I suspect that the Court
will continue to avoid the problem of a constitutional definition
of defamatory statements because of its experience in trying to state
a constitutional definition of obscenity.
Another undecided issue is whether a false statement of fact
is required for liability to anse. Can liability be imposed constitu-
tionally for an expression of opinion? Does the form of the expres-
sion control? This is a complex and difficult problem in which three
Supreme Court opinions have some relevance but do not clearly
settle the issue. 76 There are also a good many federal and state
court holdings, some of which adopt the solution presented by Sec-
tion 566 of the Second Restatement of Torts.7 The problem re-
73 Id. at 348-49.
74 See Sweeney v. Schenectady Umon Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941),
afJ'd mem., 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
75 316 U.S. at 642.
76 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339-40; Old Domimon Branch No.
496, Natl Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-84 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
77 The section provides: "A defamatory communication may consist of a statement
m the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies
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mains. A number of closely related ones may also raise a constitu-
tional question. What about a remark made in jest? What about
mere abusive language, which was not intended to be taken literal-
ly? What of a slip of the tongue or the pen? What of a statement
of opinion that is not really the speaker's honest opinion?78
Third, does the constitutional requirement of fault apply to
the colloquium? 79 The problem presented by Bindrim v.
Mitchells is especially pertinent. Defendant, a novelist, wrote a
novel (roman a clef) about a psychologist who used a "group nude-
therapy" technique for treating the psychological inhibitions of
his patients. The psychologist was pictured as foul-mouthed and
gross in appearance and manners. Plaintiff was a licensed clinical
psychologist who used the nude-therapy technique in Los
Angeles.81 Though the name was different and other attributes of
the character in the novel differed substantially from those of plain-
tiff, he regarded the differences as defamatory, contending that
people associated them with him. The California Court of Ap-
peals upheld a verdict for the plaintiff,82 and the supreme courts
of both California and the United States declined to hear the
case.83
Fourth, what defendants are entitled to the protection of New
York Times and Gertz? The press and other news media can clearly
claim the protection. What about nonmedia defendants? Although
the Court declared in a footnote that it "has never decided
the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comments a-c (1977).78 For cases and articles on these matters, see PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, CASES
AND MATERIAlS ON TORTS 996-97 (7th ed. 1982).
79 A colloquium is:
one of the usual parts of the declaration in an action for slander. It is a general
averment that the words complained of were spoken "of and concerning the
plaintiff," or concerning the extrinsic matters alleged in the inducement, and
its office is to connect the whole publication with the previous statement.
An averment that the words in question are spoken of or concerning some
usage, report, or fact which gives to words otherwise indifferent the peculiar
defamatory meaning assigned to them.
BLACKs LAW DICTIONARY 240 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
80 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
81 Id. at 33.
82 Id. at 41.
83 444 U.S. at 984.
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whether the New York Times standard can apply to any individual
defendant other than a media defendant,"84 the fact is that it did
apply the standard on behalf of "four individual petitioners" in
New York Timess5 itself, and took similar action in several other
cases, all without regarding the issue as of sufficient consequence
to discuss.8 6 A number of other courts have expressly held that
nonmedia defendants are entitled to the New York Times stan-
dard, so that this issue seems settled by the cases.87 On the issue
of whether the Gertz protection also applies to nonmedia defen-
dants the authorities are more evenly divided,88 but I feel strong-
ly that it should apply.
Fifth, on the issue of truth or falsity of the defamatory state-
ment, where should the burden of proof lie? Traditionally, truth
has been a defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. But,
if the plaintiff must now allege and prove defendant's fault regar-
ding the truth or falsity, does that have the effect of requiring him
to prove falsity as well? A Sixth Circuit case held that it does, s9
but, although the Supreme Court granted certiorari,90 the case
was settled before it could be decided.
Sixth, where is the rule on public figures going? When the New
York Times rule was extended beyond public officials to public
figures in Curtis Publishng Co. v. Butts,91 Gertz had not been
decided and the choice was between the Butts rule and the com-
mon law Since the decision in Gertz with its requirement of fault
for even private plaintiffs, the Court has been steadily narrowing
the definition of public figure. 92 Will it eventually eliminate this
84 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979) (dictum).
85 376 U.S. at 256.
86 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Henry v. Collins, 380
U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
87 See, e.g., Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982
(1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Woy v. Turner, 533
F Supp. 102, 104 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Bussie v. Larson, 501 F Supp. 1107, 1114 (M.D.
La. 1980); Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239, 247 (Iowa), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980).
88 See PROSSER, WADE & ScmvARTz, supra note 78, at 1045-46 for citations.
89 See Wilson v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
90 454 U.S. 962 (1981).
91 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
92 See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (in a libel
action brought against the author and publisher of a book which named him as a Russian
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classification and leave the "knowledge-or-reckless-disregard" stan-
dard for public officials alone?
Seventh, what is to be the test for loss of a conditional privilege
because of abuse? Under the majority rule at common law, if a
conditional privilege existed, it was treated as abused and therefore
lost if the defendant did not believe in the truth of this statement
or have reasonable basis for that belief. This is equivalent to a
negligence test. But under the Gertz rule it is necessary to prove
negligence in all cases.93 The combination of these two rules
would eliminate the significance of the conditional privilege. The
Restatement, therefore, in accordance with the minority rule at
common law, adopts the "knowledge-or-reckless-disregard" test
for abuse 4 Several courts have agreed with this position95 but
the Supreme Court has not yet considered the question.
Eighth, what is the present status of the privilege of fair com-
ment? The Restatement indicates that if recovery is not allowed
for an expression of a mere opinion with no implication of a false
statement of fact, the traditional privilege of fair comment has
been absorbed into the broader opinion rule.9 6 The Supreme
Court has given no hint of its position.
Finally, what developments will take place regarding the scope
of the "reporter's privilege"? This issue has many potential prob-
lems. The Court has apparently adopted the New York Times and
Gertz standards when it comes to interpreting an ambiguous public
spy, an admitted Russian spy's nephew, who during a 1957-58 grand jury investigation
of Soviet intelligence agents in the United States failed to respond to a grand jury sub-
poena, was not a "public figure"); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (behavioral
scientist engaged in federally funded animal research was not "public figure," either by
virtue of his successful application for federal funds, or by virtue of his access to media
while responding to receipt of the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" by the federal
agencies responsible for his funding); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (Mary
Alice Firestone, wife of the scion of a wealthy industrial family, was not a "public figure"
for holding a few press conferences during a sensationalized divorce proceeding).
13 418 U.S. at 350.
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToaTs § 593 (1977),and the Special Note un-
mediately preceding that section.
95 See British Am. & E. Co. v. Wirth, Ltd., 592 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1979); Luster v.
Retail Credit Co., 575 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties,
Inc., 563 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1977); JacronSales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976);
Moore v. Smith, 578 P.2d 26 (Wash. 1978).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 566 (1977).
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record holding that the New York Times standard requires mere-
ly that the published interpretation of the public record be a ra-
tional one, 97 while Gertz requires that the interpretation must
also be reasonable."8 This is itself somewhat ambiguous. Will the
privilege be extended beyond reporting on official meetings to
public meetings in general; or beyond that to the Second Circuit's
"fundamental principle of neutral reportage," 0 a "disinterested
reporting" of charges made by a "responsible" organization or
person?100
This list of pending problems in adjusting the relationship of
the traditional tort of defamation to the restrictions of the first
amendment could be extended further, but it is quite long enough
for the present purpose.
In two instances, the Supreme Court may have taken a
"misstep" but it still has the opportunity to correct it. The first
involves the way in which the New York Times standard is
stated.101 The expression "actual malice" is used for knowledge or
reckless disregard involving the falsity of the defamatory state-
ment. The law of defamation was already plagued by the use of
the term, "malice," in at least three other situations, each with
a different meaning, none of which is the dictionary meamng.102
"Actual malice" certainly cannot be read in a literal sense. It would
have been much better to speak of knowledge or reckless disregard,
or perhaps even of good faith.
97 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971).
98 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 448 (1976).
99 Edwards v. National Audubon Soe'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
dented, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
100 See 556 F.2d at 113. Contra Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
101 376 U.S. at 279-80 (a public official may not recover "for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not").
102 The first is so-called "malice in law" and is completely fictitious. See Bromage
v. Prosser, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B. 1825); PROSSER, WADE & SCHvARTz, supra note 78,
at 1020-22. The other two are often called "actual malice." One of them is used to in-
dicate abuse of a privilege. A privilege is abused and lost if the defendant acts for a pur-
pose other than that for which the privilege is established. Although malice in the sense
of ill-will may be an abuse under this rule, the rule is much broader in its scope. See PRO-
SSER, ToRTs 794-95 (4th ed. 1971). The second'use of "actual malice" is in regard to the
award of punitive damages. Here, too, "actual malice" in the sense of ill-will is not the
only basis for award of punitive damages. Id. at 794.
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But, more importantly, there was a mistake in defining
knowledge or reckless disregard solely from a subjective
standpoint.103 As the court itself admitted, this subjective test
"puts a premium on ignorance, encourages the irresponsible
publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be determined
by the defendant's testimony that he published the statement in
good faith and unaware of its probable falsity "1' Much difficul-
ty would have been avoided if the test had been stated in the alter-
native, with the second half made objective. For example, to use
the Court's language, the publication must have been "so inherent-
ly improbable that only a reckless man would have put [it] in cir-
culation" without making at least a minimum check on its
accuracy. I 5 This would not be adopting a negligence standard.
The second "misstep" involves damages. Gertz held that, in
the absence of proof of knowledge or reckless disregard, damages
must be "restrict[ed] . to compensation for actual injury."' 06
As a constitutional requirement, this afforded the courts an ef-
fective control over jury verdicts for excessively large amounts.
Properly developed, the concept might have gone far to reduce
some of the abuses of defamation litigation today. Indeed, recovery
might have subsequently been limited to pecumary loss, provid-
ed that the term would be interpreted to include the plaintiffs
reasonable attorney's fees, as a part of the cost of vindicating his
reputation. 07 This "reform" might instead remake the nature of
a defamation action and turn it back again to an action for vin-
dication of reputation. But the court has failed to utilize the op-
portunity. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, o8 it decided to review an
award of $100,000 for mental distress when the plaintiff did not
claim damages for injury to reputation. Since that time big damage
awards, including punitive damages, have become common place.
103 St. Amant v Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731 (the defendant must have "in fact enter-
tamed serious doubts as to the truth of the publication").
104 Id. The Court did not respond to this change. The recent motion picture, Absence
of Malice, vividly portrays how unscrupulous ]ournalists may seek to take advantage of
this "loophole."
'05 Id. at 732.
106 418 U.S. at 349.
107 See the treatment in PROSSER, WADE & SCHWA'RZ, supra note 78, at 1078-80.
108 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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It was exactly this type of situation, with huge damage awards
for the purpose of controlling what a newspaper printed, that
precipitated the holding in the seminal case of New York Times
v. Sullivan.
B. The First Amendment and Other Common Law Torts
The Supreme Court has also held that the first amendment
affects the tort of unreasonable invasion of the right of
privacy.0 9 Here, too, many quite difficult constitutional ques-
tions remain to be settled. In holding, in Cox Broadcasting Co.
v. Cohn,"0 that there could be no cause of action for disclosure
of true facts contained in a public record, even though they would
be highly embarrassing to a reasonable person,"' the Court was
simply taking the established common law tort rule and making
it a rule of constitutional law. Other tort limitations on the ac-
tion for public disclosure of embarrassing facts will probably also
be adopted. For example, the Court at some point will probably
clarify what facts must be disclosed about a public figure to give
rise to a cause of action. The major question, not yet settled, is
whether the first amendment permits any action at all for public
disclosure of true facts.112 Another question: May a public figure
acquire a private status through the passage of time?"'
With regard to false-light privacy cases, the Court held ear-
ly, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,"1 that the New York Times standard
applied to false-light cases in general."n Gertz, by establishing a
negligence standardl6 and refusing to extend the New York
109 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"0 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
"' Id. at 496.
112 On this issue, see Virgil v. Time, Inc. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), 6ert. denied,
425 U.S. 998 (1975); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). Both
indicate that the answer to the question is in the affirmative.
113 Cf. Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.) (a person who
becomes a public figure in connection with a particular controversy retains that status
for later comments on that same controversy), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed,
454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (dismissal of certiorari was because the case was settled).
114 385 U.S. at 374.
"5 Id. at 390-91.
116 418 U.S. at 346.
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Times standard to private individuals as the plurality in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,117 had suggested, has thrown
the continued validity of Time v. Hill into serious question. It will
take a Supreme Court decision to settle that issue for us. 18
Another form of unreasonable invasion of the right of privacy
is that of wrongful intrusion, which may occur because of a
physical intrusion or intrusion into the plaintiff's private affairs.
How far will the implications of this come under the control of
the first amendment?
Another tort to be affected by the first amendment is that of
injurious falsehood." 9 It differs from defamation in that its pur-
pose is not to compensate for harm to the plaintiff's personal
reputation but instead to compensate for pecuniary loss (called
special damages) incurred because of a false statement published
about the plaintiff, his property or his business. Although the
Supreme Court has not spoken on the matter, there seems little
doubt that some of the common law elements will become con-
stitutional requirements, and additional ones may be imposed.
What is involved here is commercial speech, which is now held
to be entitled to constitutional protection'2 0 but subject to what
may be a different balance drawn between the conflicting
interests.12 1 This issue remains to be worked out definitively
There is also the question of the basis on which to draw a line
for determining when the New York Times standard and the Gertz
standard should be applied. Several federal district court cases treat
these matters. 2
117 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Court applied a standard of knowing falsity when an alleged-
ly defamatory statement related to plaintiffs involvement in a matter of public concern,
whether plaintiff was a public figure or a private individual).
118 In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to decide the issue, since the defendant's conduct was held
to meet the New York Times test.
119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A-652 (1977); Prosser, Injurious
Falsehood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 425 (1959).
120 See Virgima State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virgima Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
121 Cf. Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 500 (Powell, J., concurrng).
12 See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Umon, 508 F Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,
692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1872 (1983). See also Hormng v.
Hardy, 373 A.2d 1273 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
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The torts of interference with contractual relations or with
prospective economic advantage also frequently involve the use
of speech. It will undoubtedly be necessary to compare the
elements of these torts with the first amendment and work out
the appropriate adjustment. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court
did exactly that quite recently in the case of NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co. ,1 setting aside a judgment in favor of white mer-
chants in Port Gibson, Mississippi, for peaceful boycotting by
blacks against the plaintiff in order to obtain fairer and more
equitable treatment from the plaintiffs.
The several torts of misrepresentation also involve use of
speech. Suits for deceit and negligent misrepresentation require
fault and are therefore not likely to run afoul of the first amend-
ment. But what of a misrepresentation action based on innocent
misrepresentation, or even mistake? What about a suit for non-
disclosure, or failure to speak? For that matter, what about a pro-
ducts liability action based on strict liability under Restatement
section 402B,1 14 on express warranty coming from a casual
remark in negotiations, or on a failure to warn of danger or pro-
vide adequate instructions?'2
CONCLUSION
Let me close by offering two further independent thoughts.
A good number of tort cases will come before the federal courts
in the immediate future. They will involve difficult questions and
present interesting and intellectually stimulating problems, much
more so than many of the cases now coming before the courts.
Some of these problems have been created by the Supreme Court's
efforts to reduce the flood of cases coming before it and the other
federal courts. Ironically, at least as far as the appellate courts
are concerned, these efforts sometimes seem to have had the op-
posite effect.
1'2 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
12 For a previous treatment of most of the matters in this section, see Wade, The
Communtcative Torts and The First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671 (1977).
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